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Introduction
During the 1990s, stock options became an increasingly popular compensation method in many countries (e.g. Hall, 1998; Murphy, 1999) . Initially, option programs were typically allocated, almost without exception, only to executives. 1 But this association of stock options mainly with managerial compensation changed rapidly after more and more companies worldwide started to issue stock options to the workforce more broadly (e.g. Weeden, Carberry and Rodrick, 1998; Lebow, Sheiner, Slifman and Starr-McCluer, 1998; and Blasi, Kruse and Bernstein, 2003) . In turn this growth of stock options has generated heated public discussion with some viewing stock options as a device by which managers transfer excessive benefits to themselves, while others see options as a major innovation in managerial and personnel compensation.
The growth of options has also been accompanied by a mushrooming of theoretical and empirical literature on stock options (e.g. Ittner, Lambert and Larcker, 2003) . Whereas sharp disagreements exist among theorists on the expected economic impact of different types of option schemes, existing empirical work consistently finds that firm performance is enhanced by stock options. However, the findings based on existing empirical work are potentially limited. Empirical analysis has been forced to rely on data that may not be representative, typically are for only short time periods and are mainly for the U.S. and the U.K. (e.g. Conyon and Freeman, 2004; Sesil, Kroumova, Blasi and Kruse, 2002) .
Moreover, existing data may not enable a careful investigation of the productivity effects of different types of option plans.
By contrast in this paper we use new panel data that we have assembled. The data include all Finnish publicly listed firms during a relatively long period, namely 1992-2002.
Thus it enables us to see if previous findings based mainly on evidence generated using US and UK data, are applicable to another country which once had a very different system of corporate governance but which has recently moved to adopt an Anglo-Saxon model. In our empirical work we estimate Cobb-Douglas production functions with different stock option program indicators. Furthermore, whereas earlier empirical literature has used cross-section and fixed effects models, we also address the potentially important issue of endogeneity of inputs and options by estimating dynamic panel data models with a GMM estimator.
For broad-based option scheme indicators the key result is that different estimators consistently find a statistically insignificant association with firm productivity. For selective option schemes, the baseline fixed effects estimator suggests a 2.1-2.4% positive and statistically significant effect of the dilution indicator on firm productivity. However, in empirical models in which endogeneity and dynamics are accounted for, no evidence is found of a link with firm productivity. Insofar as our findings do not provide support for hypotheses of a positive association between option schemes and firm productivity, our findings differ in important ways from earlier findings that are based on less rigorous methods and more limited data.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the conceptual underpinnings for the study and also surveys relevant empirical research on the productivity effects of stock options and related schemes. In section 3 we describe the institutional framework and our most unusual data. Section 4 outlines our empirical strategy and this is followed by a presentation of our findings. In the final section we provide conclusions and implications of the paper.
Conceptual Framework and Previous Empirical Work
A key argument of proponents of stock options is that options can align the interest of employees and shareholders. For example, stock options may motivate employees to exert more effort and take actions that are mutually beneficial to both owners and employees.
The motivational effect of stock options may be especially relevant in situations where alternative approaches, such as direct monitoring or piece rates, are not feasible, perhaps because of monitoring difficulties (Sesil, Kroumova, Blasi and Kruse, 2002) .
Stock options change the compensation structure so that employee total compensation increases in good times and decreases in bad times. This has several consequences for labor turnover and firm survival. Stock options have been deemed crucial in recruiting and retaining employees, especially in markets where employees are potentially highly mobile (Rousseau and Shperling, 2003) . Stock options may also help to retain key employees, both because they adjust pay according to current market conditions (Oyer, 2004) and because they are a deferred form of compensation. Finally, stock options may prevent inefficient firm closures, since they substitute for contractual payments and hence save cash in bad times (Inderst and Müller, 2005) .
However, there has also been criticism of stock options. For example, stock options, when exercised, entail a cost to shareholders in the form of dilution of ownership.
Also others note that the costs of stock options have not been included in income statements (e.g. Hall and Murphy, 2003.) Hence they argue that the increasing popularity of options in part reflects firms' mistakenly thinking that options are a cheaper form of compensation than their true cost.
Also, a potential performance impact has been questioned. Payment schemes that reward collective performance suffer from the free-rider problem: an individual who increases his effort will bear the full cost of the increase in effort, but will realise only a small part of the resulting increase in output (e.g. Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Oyer, 2004) . Another criticism comes from psychological expectancy theory (Vroom, 1995) .
According to the "line-of-sight" argument, rewards based on performance can only be motivating if, by their actions, employees can influence the measures on which performance-pay is based. This is typically not the case with stock option plans, where employees (with possible exception of top executives) can hardly perceive any direct link between their actions and the share price performance.
Both free-rider and line-of-sight arguments have been countered in the literature.
First, when rewards are based on group performance, according to Kandel and Lazear (1992) it is in the interest of individual employees to develop a group norm where the employees monitor the performance of their peers and prevent free-riding behaviour.
Second, equity schemes may create a common bond or "psychological ownership" among employees and thus change their behaviour so that it would match the collective interest (Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan, 1990; Baron and Kreps, 1999) .
Another cost related to equity schemes is that they increase the risk employees are facing, since employees have both a substantial proportion of their financial capital and human capital invested in one workplace. Since they do not value their options to the same extent as an outsider would, employees may require higher total compensation (Meulbrok, 2002) . However, there can be important differences between executives and employees in these respects. In the compensation of top executives, the line-of-sight and diversification problems are not as severe as with lower-level employees (Hall and Murphy, 2003) . On the other hand, executive stock option compensation may be motivated by rent-seeking activities (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003) .
Ultimately the impact of stock options on business performance is an empirical question. However, when turning to empirical work, it appears that there is only a limited amount of work that examines the consequences of stock options for firm-level performance. 2 Conyon and Freeman (2004) examine the economic outcomes of broadbased option schemes in a sample of UK listed firms during 1995-1998, i.e. during a period when the stock market was rising. They use three survey data sets for 284 firms, estimate fixed effects regressions and find evidence that the presence of a stock option plan is significantly associated with higher firm-level productivity. Sesil, Kroumova, Blasi and Kruse (2004) use survey data on broad-based option schemes from different sectors in the US provided by the National Center for Employee Ownership. They find that, in 1997, stock option firms had 28% higher productivity than non-option firms and 31% higher productivity than their non-option pairs. However, the response rate of the survey is only 10% yielding 73 firms in the final data set. In a subsequent study the same four authors (Sesil, Kroumova, Blasi and Kruse, 2002) compare the performance of 229 new economy firms, which offer broad-based option schemes to their non-stock option granting counterparts. They find evidence that productivity is higher in firms with broad-based plans. Their research methods include descriptive analysis, paired matching comparisons between broad-based and non-broad-based options firms within the same industry, and a cross-section regression for 1997. Ittner, Lambert and Larcker (2003) use survey data to examine 217 new economy U.S. firms during 1999-2000. By using cross-section analyses they examine the performance consequences of option and equity grants to senior-level executives, lower-level managers, and other employees. Their findings indicate that lower than expected option grants and/or existing option holdings are associated with lower accounting and stock price performance in subsequent years.
In sum the empirical evidence from these studies suggests the existence of a positive and often quite sizeable link between stock option plans and productivity at the firm-level. In turn, this implies that the available evidence provides support for theorists who predict that potentially powerful economic effects will flow from options and dominate the effect of factors such as free riding, accounting myopia and managerial rent-seeking. However, before accepting this conclusion it is important to note some key shortcomings of these studies. For one thing, in all of these studies, often the data are based on surveys and are apt to suffer from various selection biases, for example three studies focus only on new economy firms. Second, nearly all studies are limited insofar as they concentrate on the time-period before the stock market collapse in 2000. Third, and at odds with most theory, no studies are able to reliably distinguish the productivity impact of selective versus broad-based plans. Fourth, the econometric methods that the available data enable researchers to use are sometimes less than desirable. Thus some studies have access only to cross-sectional data, and none appear to seriously address the potentially highly important issues of endogeneity of option schemes and inputs used in a production process.
While there are only a small number of empirical studies on the impact of stock options on firm performance, the empirical literature on the productivity effects of other forms of employee financial compensation that are alternative to the traditional fixed-wage arrangements, such as employee profit-sharing and employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs)
is quite large. 3 Consequently, it is useful to briefly highlight some key issues and findings in that literature since this may help to shape the empirical strategy we adopt in this study.
Typically studies of firms with employee profit-sharing plans find a positive relationship between profit-sharing and firm productivity. This is the conclusion of several surveys including, for example, Weitzman and Kruse (1990) and Jones and Pliskin (1991) .
This typical finding emerges from the empirical studies that employ diverse methods to investigate profit sharing arrangements that exist in a variety of institutional settings including the former West Germany (Cable and Wilson, 1990) , the UK (Wadhwani and Wall, 1990) , the US (Kruse, 1992) and Finland (Kauhanen and Piekkola, 2002) . Findings based on studies of firms with employee stock ownership plans also typically support the existence of a positive relationship between ESOPs and firm productivity or performance.
However, as many surveys point out (e.g. Kruse, 2002) , the evidence in support of this positive link is probably less robust than for profit sharing. Again there is evidence that employee stock ownership can be positively associated with enhanced business performance in a variety of institutional settings including Japan (Jones and Kato, 1995) and the U.S. (Kumbhakar and Dunbar, 1993) .
However, this other literature also draws attention to the potential sensitivity of findings to several factors. Prominent among these is the need to have data that are not distinguished by various kinds of selection bias, a common problem with survey data.
Another key matter is the issue of institutional detail-the form of the ESOP or profit sharing arrangement often matters. Also, some theorists argue that for sustained effects on enterprise performance, financial participation must be accompanied by changes in decision-making participation. Hence a failure to include controls for such other factors may lead to empirical models that are misspecified (e.g. Conte and Svejnar, 1988) . Finally, there is the issue of the appropriate econometric approach. Amongst several potential matters, the sensitivity of findings to potential issues of endogeneity of plan schemes and inputs used in production is clear.
In devising our empirical strategy we will respond to these issues that are highlighted by the concerns as best we can. Our data will enable us to address most of these matters. The only exception is our lacking data for other HR practices such as participation in decisionmaking. Because we utilise public firm-level data on stock option plans, we cannot control for the level of employee participation in decision-making, the existence of profit sharing, and other human resource management practices. We can, however, separate all constant firm-and common time-specific effects from several other factors that possibly have effects on firm productivity by using fixed effects and GMM estimators.
Institutions and the Data
In this section we describe the institutional context and the data. To examine the impact of stock option compensation on firm productivity we assemble new panel data for Finnish firms for 1992-2002. This was a particularly turbulent period in Finnish economic history.
In 1990, Finland had just entered a deep depression, which was the most severe of any OECD country since the Second World War. In 1995, Finland joined the European Union and, in 2002, adopted the common European currency, the Euro, in the first wave of adoptions.
In industrial relations, the most marked change during the period of interest was the increased use of performance-related pay (Kauhanen and Piekkola, 2002) . On the other hand, collective bargaining and centralised income agreements remained intact. The unionisation rate was between 70 and 80 percent throughout the period.
The increase in stock option compensation reflects a deep change in the Finnish corporate governance system. In the end of 1980s, the Finnish corporate governance system in listed firms was very much bank-centred and resembled the German system.
The stock market started its recovery after the recession in 1993, and the importance of the equity market in financial intermediation grew throughout the 1990s. Both the turnover and market value of firms listed on the stock exchange increased dramatically throughout the decade, with Nokia leading this development. In the end of the1990s the Helsinki Stock
Exchange saw a wave of new listings. Now stock markets are much thicker, more transparent and arguably provide more reliable information than in the past. At the same time, both monitoring of insider trading and legal punishments have become stricter. During the last 10-15 years Finland has shifted from a bank-based financial intermediation closer to a market-based Anglo-American system. As part of this institutional change publicly listed Finnish firms have adopted stock option schemes extensively in the 1990s. As discussed below, the most active period of stock option adoption coincided with the height of the stock market boom in the late 1990s. However, as stock market prices started to fall after May 2000, accelerating further in 2001 and 2002, the rate of stock option adoption decreased markedly.
All of our firms are traded on the Helsinki Stock Exchange (HEX). However, firms that were on the two smaller lists (i.e. the Over-the-counter and the Stockbroker's list), that were maintained by investment banks and stock brokerage companies, are excluded before 1997 due to their rather low economic significance compared to the main list. Since 1997 HEX has taken over the smaller lists and also has started to operate two additional lists besides its main list: the "I" (Investor) -list and the "NM" (New Market)-list. The "I-list"
consists of firms that are traded infrequently and are often majority-owned by large investors. The "NM" list consists of smaller IT and high technology firms, similar to the NASDAQ or the Neuer Markt in Frankfurt. Thus, we have information on the presence of option schemes on the main list throughout the period and on the minor lists since 1997.
However, we do not have option program information on firms that have not been listed in the HEX, since our option data are based on public information of listed firms. We are aware that some unlisted Finnish firms have adopted option schemes, at least during the bull market at the end of the 1990s. Unfortunately, there was no option data information available for these firms. 4 We expect that these programs were more likely to be located within the ICT sector than in other sectors. We believe, however, that the set of these unlisted firms is moderate, since stock option compensation works properly only in situations where the value of shares can be assessed by the stock market. Our panel data on stock options were initially organised by Professor Seppo Ikäheimo from the Helsinki School of Economics. However we have used several sources to complement and update the original data. These include annual reports, stock market releases and option data obtained from Alexander Corporate Finance, an investment bank.
We use these data to briefly describe the general evolution of Finnish stock option plans during 1992-2002. 5 Column (1) in Table 1 gives the total number of firms during the period. The number of firms at the HEX fluctuates considerably, which partially relates to the business cycle. Column (2) (4) and (5) we approach this issue from another angle and provide time series data on the existence of option schemes. In these columns, we also use information on the timing of the scheme as well as on the launching of the scheme. In Column (4) In the analysis that follows, we distinguish between broad-based and selective schemes. The latter are mostly managerial schemes, although they can also include other key personnel (e.g. R&D workers). However, in order to qualify as a broad-based scheme, all employees (or at least a great majority) should be eligible. The classification is based on public stock exchange reports. 7 Finnish Law on Joint Stock Companies requires firms to report all relevant conditions about stock option schemes to shareholders prior to adoption. While a high rate of eligibility does not automatically guarantee a high participation rate, there are good reasons to believe that these are closely connected. For one thing, employees usually face only small costs when they subscribe to options-e.g. by providing a zero-interest loan to the company, with the company repaying the loan at face value after a certain period, usually 1-3 years. Thus, while employees face a cost in terms of foregone interest and liquidity, typically this cost is far below the real value of the options.
Moreover, not all companies use this procedure, but rather they essentially give options to employees for free. 8
In our empirical work, we develop three option program indicators. These measures reflect the presence or absence of an option scheme, the size of the scheme and whether the scheme is selective or broad-based. Two measures are binary variables and one is a continuous variable. 9 Our first binary indicator is opt measuring the presence of a scheme in a firm in given year t. It equals one for the group of option firms and zero otherwise.
Thus, the indicator distinguishes option and non-option firms allowing us to examine the average impact of the presence of options on firm productivity.
Our second binary indicator also measures the presence or absence of a plan but it distinguishes between selective (ssopt) and broad-based (bbsopt) option plans. By a selective plan we mean a scheme that is targeted to a selected group of employees. These schemes include managerial programs, but also schemes that are targeted to key personnel.
Broad-based plans are all encompassing, including managers, but they do not have to be egalitarian in the sense of all participants having the same number of options. By using these distinct dummy variables we can examine whether the average impact of plans on firm productivity differs between selective and broad-based option schemes.
Our third program indicator is potential dilution (dilu). This indicator measures the potential size of effective schemes in firm i in year t. 10 This is a continuous variable-the ratio of the number of shares that may be awarded through effective stock option plans in a given year divided by the sum of total number of shares and the number of new shares that may be awarded through options at the end of a year. If a program ends in the middle of the year t, then the year t-1 is the last year used in calculating dilution. The indicator distinguishes option and non-option firms allowing us to examine the average impact of options on firm productivity. To investigate whether the productivity impact varies by plan characteristics, we also use separate dilution indicators, namely diluss for selective and dilubb for broad-based plans. To capture possible dynamic effects of a program, we also use once lagged dilution indicators.
It is worth stressing that our panel data include almost all listed Finnish companies during the period 1992-2002. We have dropped a few firms due to entry and attrition of listed firms at the Helsinki Stock Exchange (HEX). Also, some firms merged during the period. In this case, we have included only merged firms and excluded all information prior to the merger. Also, we exclude a firm if data for a key variable such as value-added are missing. Finally, to exclude potential outliers, we delete observations where: employment is less than 50 (32 firm-year observations); fixed capital is less than €1,000,000 (23 firm-year observations); or employment is more than 50,000 (4 firm-year observations). Table 3 presents summary statistics. 
Econometric Strategy
We test two key hypotheses, namely: (i) that firm-level productivity is expected to be higher in option than in non-option firms; (ii) that the impact of options on firm productivity is expected to be dependent upon whether the plan is broad-based or selective.
Our basic empirical strategy is to use a production function approach and panel data estimators. First, we estimate a series of baseline fixed effects estimators by assuming that all explanatory variables are strictly exogenous. Second, we estimate dynamic panel data GMM estimators to account for the potential endogeneity of a firm's decisions on inputs and option schemes. The following issues have influenced the specific empirical strategy we adopt.
First, we assume a Cobb-Douglas form of technology, since it has been used frequently in the related literature such as the evaluation of the effects of ESOPs on firm productivity (e.g. Jones and Kato, 1995) and when analysing the effects of stock options on firm performance (e.g. Conyon and Freeman, 2004 .) Second, although the Cobb-Douglas functional form is more restrictive than other functional forms such as the translog, we prefer the Cobb-Douglas production function since, when accounting for endogeneity of inputs and options in GMM models, the instrument matrix Z i may become sizeable under the translog specification, thereby biasing estimates in finite samples. 11 Third, we assume that option schemes may only have a direct impact on firm productivity. 12 Fourth, since we do not have information on the detailed terms of option schemes, such as the exercise prices of options, we must bypass potentially important matters surrounding this issue. 13
There are two reasons for using the fixed effects estimator in our baseline estimates. In part this is pragmatic -we use the fixed effects estimator because it has been used in the previous studies. For example, the estimator has been used in assessing the productivity effects of ESOPs (e.g. Jones and Kato, 1995) and stock options (e.g. Conyon and Freeman, 2004) . Second, as is well known, firm fixed effects allow us to control for unobserved time-invariant differences in firms, such as managerial ability, employee quality and organization structure. We denote a firm's production function by (.) f , which relates firm value added 14 at time t, i.e. it va , to inputs used in production and control variables: 2, .. ., N and t=1,2,...,T.
In Equation (1) (1) is the following Cobb-Douglas production function: In Equation (2) the variables are the same as in Equation (1). Thus, a firm's inputs in the production process are capital k it and labor l it ; eo it is an option program indicator; x it is a vector of possible control variables including industry-specific year dummies; η i 's are individual firm fixed effects and ε it is the error term. The estimation results for Equation (5) are reported in section 5.
If the assumption of strict exogeneity assumption is violated, the baseline fixed effects estimator is potentially inconsistent. Therefore, we relax the strict exogeneity assumption on capital and labor inputs as well as on option schemes and estimate dynamic GMM models. 16 We also use these models to explore the dynamic effects of stock options. To obtain asymptotically consistent parameter estimates when an explanatory variable is likely to have violated the strict exogeneity assumption, we estimate single equation GMM estimators 17 by assuming the following dynamic model:
, In Equation (3) all variables correspond to those in equation (2). The presence of individual effects η i in the error term ε it implies that the lagged dependent variable va i,t-1 is positively correlated with ε it . Thus, at least in large samples with serially uncorrelated error terms v it , it can be shown that the OLS level estimator for va β is inconsistent. Furthermore, the omitted variable literature implies that the OLS level estimator for va β is biased upward in large samples (see, e.g. Bond, 2002) .
The fixed effects estimator (the within group estimator) removes this inconsistency by transforming each variable to be its deviation from its firm mean.
However, if the number of time periods is small, the within group transformation introduces a non-negligible negative correlation between a transformed lagged value added va i,t-1 and a transformed error term v it . This result indicates that, at least in large samples (N large), the fixed effects estimator for va β is biased downward (see, e.g. Bond, 2002) .
The fact that the OLS level estimator for Equation (3) is likely to be biased upwards and the fixed effects estimator is likely to be biased downwards can be useful information in assessing whether an estimator is consistent. In other words, a consistent estimator would lie between the OLS level and the fixed effects estimator. If we do not observe this pattern or an estimator is close to either the OLS level or the fixed effects estimator, we might suspect severe finite sample bias or inconsistency (see, e.g. Bond, 2002) .
We follow a dynamic panel data GMM estimation strategy and allow explanatory variables to be correlated with the individual effects η i , since we exclude these effects from Equation (3) by a first-difference transformation: and that the error term it v is serially uncorrelated. We then apply the lagged levels of , 1 i t va − dated at t-2 and t-3 as instruments for the corresponding first-differenced variables.
To account for potential endogeneity of inputs and options in equation (4), we proceed in two steps. In the first stage, we assume that only labour and capital inputs are endogenous variables. In the second stage, we also assume that option schemes are endogenous (as well as the input variables.) When addressing the potential endogeneity of capital it k and labour it l inputs, we assume that , it it k l are predetermined and use the lagged levels of and it it k l dated at t-1 and t-2 as instruments for the corresponding first-differenced variables. In other words, we assume that there is no contemporaneous correlation between the inputs and the error term it v , but that the inputs may be correlated with , 1 i t v − and earlier shocks. 18 To address endogeneity of option schemes, we treat the dilution option program indicator , i t eo as predetermined. 19 Then we use the once lagged variable, denoted t-1, as an instrument for the corresponding firstdifferenced option program variables.
By accepting the moment condition restrictions above, we may construct an instrument variable matrix Z i , where the lagged levels of explanatory variables are used as instruments for the corresponding first-differenced variables. 20 We follow the terminology suggested by Bond (2002) and call these estimators the differenced GMM estimators. As an extended estimator we apply the system GMM estimator 21 by also assuming that the levels of explanatory variables, i.e. , Table 5 reports the baseline contemporaneous fixed effects estimates for a Cobb-Douglas production function during 1992-2002. 23 The estimator deviates from the standard fixed effects estimator in that we have specified a first-order autocorrelation process in the residuals. This is the preferred estimation approach, since the autocorrelation tests strongly indicates that the disturbance term is first-order autoregressive. 24
Empirical Results
Three main conclusions emerge from Table 5 . First, the estimates for capital and labor are highly significant in columns (1)-(4). The baseline elasticity of capital input is close to 0.15, whereas for labor it is about 0.62. 25 Second, in columns (1) and (2), where our option program indicator is the presence of a plan, we do not find statistically significant evidence of contemporaneous association between options and firm productivity. In column (1) the parameter estimate for the option program indicator is 0.002, but it is statistically insignificant. In column (2) the signs of parameters differ between selective and broad-based indicators. The selective scheme estimate is 0.015 and the broad-based scheme -0.028. However, both are statistically insignificant. Third, in columns (3) and (4), where our option program indicator is the size of a plan, we find statistically significant evidence of contemporaneous association between selective schemes and firm productivity (at the 10% level.) The parameter estimate for selective schemes is 0.84, whereas for broad-based schemes it is statistically insignificant -0.256.
The mean dilution for selective schemes is 0.0286 indicating, on average, a 2.4% effect on firm productivity (0.0286*0.84=0.024).
Tables 6-8 show estimation results for the OLS level, the fixed effects, the differenced GMM and the system GMM estimators for a Cobb-Douglas production function. 26 The reported GMM estimates are based on the two-step GMM estimator with heteroskedastic-consistent asymptotic standard errors. 27 We also perform a finite-sample 3. Absolute values of t statistics in parentheses. *** Significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level, respectively. 4. Opt is a dummy variable for the presence of an option program, ssopt is a dummy variable for the presence of a selective program and bbsopt is a dummy variable for the presence of a broad-based option program. Diluss is an interaction variable between potential dilution and ssopt dummy. Dilubb is an interaction variable between potential dilution and bbsopt dummy. 5. Industry-specific year dummies for the ICT, the manufacturing and the service sectors are included in all models. 6. 1) The tests are based on the standard fixed effects models without modelling first-order autoregression. Baltagi-Wu LBI is the Baltagi-Wu (1999) correction proposed by Windmeijer (2000) , since simulation studies have shown that these standard errors are downward biased. 28 For all test statistics, we rely on the two-step GMM estimator.
In Table 6 we relax the strict exogeneity assumptions on inputs. Our program indicators are dummy variables, i.e. we measure the presence of a plan. The following key findings emerge from Table 6 . First, the OLS level parameter estimates for va t-1 in columns (1) and (2) are substantially higher than the fixed effects estimates in columns (3) and (4).
As noted earlier, a consistent GMM estimator would lie between these two estimators. Unfortunately we find that the differenced GMM estimates for va t-1 in columns (5) and (6) are below the fixed effects estimates. Thus we suspect severe finite sample bias or inconsistency which, in this case, is likely to be associated with weak instruments for individual series that are highly time persistent. 29 Another indication of inconsistency is that the differenced GMM parameter estimates for capital inputs reported in columns (5) and (6) are about twice as large as the OLS level and the fixed effects estimates reported in columns (1)-(4).
Second, Table 6 suggests that the estimates for the presence of a plan are statistically insignificant. In our preferred specifications, reported in columns (7) and (8), where we have controlled for simultaneity of inputs by treating them as predetermined, the signs of the option and selective scheme indicators are positive, but the coefficient for the broad-based scheme indicator is negative. In sum, we do not find statistical evidence of a contemporaneous association between option programs and firm productivity. Third, the system GMM parameter estimates using a lagged dependent variable and reported in columns (7) and (8) are lower than the OLS level estimates but higher than the fixed effects estimates. This finding indicates that the system GMM estimator is likely to be consistent, at least for the lagged dependent variable.
Fourth, the autocorrelation tests, namely m1 and m2 reported in columns (7) and (8), provide support for the system GMM estimator. The tests indicate significant negative autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals but not in the second-order residuals. This is exactly how it should be, if the disturbances are serially uncorrelated, indicating that the key assumption for the consistency of the system GMM estimator is fulfilled. Moreover, the Sargan test clearly accepts the validity of instruments in columns (5)-(8). 
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Next we focus on the endogeneity of an option program, since that may be driving the baseline fixed effects estimates reported in Table 6 . The findings reported in Table 7 are based on a program's size indicator 30 , but otherwise the estimation approach is similar to that underlying the findings presented in Table 6 . Since the OLS level and the fixed effects estimates for the lagged dependent variable, the capital and labor inputs are almost the same in both the tables, we do not discuss these findings any further.
The following key findings emerge from Table 7 . First, the fixed effect estimate for selective programs reported in column (4) support the positive association, reported previously in Table 6 . Now the parameter estimate is 0.73 and it is statistically significant at the 10% level.
The mean dilution for selective schemes is 0.0286 indicating, on average, a 2.1% effect on firm productivity (0.0286*0.73=0.021). Note, however, that the fixed effects findings in columns (3) and (4) are based on the assumption that the explanatory variables are strictly exogenous. Second, the system GMM estimators in columns (7)-(10) suggest that, after controlling for potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables, all the estimated option dilution indicators are found to be statistically insignificant. In columns (7) and (8), where we have controlled for simultaneity of capital and labor inputs by treating them as predetermined, the signs of all indicators are positive. In columns (9) and (10) we also treat the dilution indicators as predetermined (to control for simultaneity), but even then we do not find any evidence that is statistically significant that programs can be associated with firm productivity. The parameter estimate for the selective scheme reported in column (10) is now about one third as large (0.25) as the statistically significant fixed effects estimate of 0.73 reported in column (4).
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In Table 8 we expand our investigation to account for the dynamic effects of option programs, since a stock option program typically spans several years. Hence the effect on productivity may be realized with a lag. To account for dynamics we keep all the assumptions used in the models reported in Table 7 , but in Table 8 we report estimates that use both contemporaneous and once lagged program indicators. As an option program indicator we use the size of a plan. A Wald test is used to determine whether contemporaneous and lagged indicators are jointly zero. We first estimate the OLS level and the fixed effects models in columns (1)-(4), thereafter the system GMM estimators in columns (5)-(8). 32 In columns (5) and (6) we treat capital and labor inputs as predetermined, and in columns (7) and (8), besides capital and labor, we also treat the program indicator as predetermined.
The key finding is that we do not find convincing statistical evidence of an association between option programs and firm productivity. The evidence for a selective scheme having positive effects on productivity when using fixed effects estimators and reported in Tables 5 and 7 , is not supported in the dynamic models. While the sum of contemporaneous and lagged parameter estimates of selective schemes is 0.81, they are jointly statistically insignificant (p-value 0.24). Also, the system GMM estimates for program indicators are all found to be statistically insignificant.
Conclusions and Implications
In this paper we assemble new panel data for all Finnish publicly listed firms during a relatively long period, namely 1992-2002. Our data enable us to distinguish different types of option plans and to seriously address issues of endogeneity concerning options and inputs. Consequently we are able to see if previous findings that are based mainly on evidence generated using data that are less representative and for shorter time periods are sustained.
We proceed by estimating Cobb-Douglas production functions with three different option program indicators. These measures reflect the presence or absence of an option scheme, the size of the scheme and whether the scheme is selective or broad based.
Furthermore, the long panel nature of our data allows us to estimate dynamic panel data models with a GMM estimator and thus address the potentially important issue of endogeneity of inputs and options.
The most important finding, yielded almost consistently in diverse specifications, is a statistically insignificant association between option programs and firm productivity.
This result is exceptionally robust for broad-based schemes and is independent of what option program indicator is used in estimations. As such our findings are consistent with those who hypothesize that the performance impact of options will be limited because of reasons such as free-rider problems (e.g. Oyer, 2004) , accounting myopia (e.g. Hall and Murphy, 2003) or line-of-sight arguments (e.g. Vroom, 1995) . As such our results are consistent with much of the financial literature that does not find evidence of a link between options and business performance (e.g. Hall and Murphy, 2003.) For selective programs, however, findings are less consistent. In our baseline fixed effects estimates we find a statistically significant productivity impact that is between 2.1-2.4%. Since most selective plans are allocated to executives and/or key employees, this finding also provides support for the line-of-sight argument--rewards based on performance can only be motivating if the action of employees can influence the measures on which the performance-pay is based. Equally, this evidence does not provide support those who stress managerial rent-seeking as the principal reason for introducing selective option plans. However in models where endogeneity is accounted for, we do not find any strong evidence of a link with firm productivity. Similarly in models that investigate the dynamics of selective programs, no association between selective options and firm productivity is found.
In sum, our findings differ in important ways from earlier findings that are based on less rigorous methods and use more limited data. In particular, our findings do not provide strong support for hypotheses of a positive association between option schemes and firm productivity. In turn, our findings are consistent with hypotheses that predict negligible effects of option plans for enterprise performance, such as those based on free riding, or psychological expectancy theory or accounting myopia. However, by finding weak evidence for productivity effects of targeted schemes (and none for broad-based plans) our findings tend not to provide strong support for hypotheses based on managerial rent seeking. 21 The benefit of using the system GMM estimator is that it is shown to be more efficient than the differenced GMM estimator in large samples. 22 To us the non-correlation seems more plausible approach than assuming that the first-differences of capital and labour are uncorrelated with individual effects η i . 23 We use Stata/SE 9.1 for Windows statistical package in estimating the models of Table 5 . 24 We also performed the modified Wald statistics to examine a groupwise heteroskedasticity in the residuals when estimating a standard fixed effects estimator. The statistics indicate a violation in assumption that the error term is homoskedastic. Thus, the modified Wald statistic indicates that the fixed effects estimator is not efficient, which challenges our conclusions on the significance levels of the standard fixed effects parameters. However, the modified Wald statistics should be also used with caution, since its power can be low in the context of fixed effects with "large N, small T". Unfortunately, we are unaware of any fixed effects estimators that account simultaneously for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. We estimate heteroskedastic robust estimates in the GMM models; therefore we prefer accounting for autocorrelation in Table 5 . The autocorrelation ρ is calculated by -tscorr-option in -xtregar-model by using the Stata/SE 9.1 for Windows statistical package. The benefit of using -tscorr-is that ρ is bounded in [-1,1] .
